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Race relations in the United States have had a long history, but one that
is marked by significant discontinuities over time. The period of slavery
was followed by the brief but radically different window of Reconstruc-
tion. The Jim Crow system that developed over the following century
legalized racial segregation and discrimination, especially but not exclu-
sively in the South. The civil rights revolution effectively ended that two-
caste system of race relations, replacing it with a universal system of for-
mal legal equality. Nevertheless, considerable racial inequality remains
in many areas of the society, such as in income, wealth, educational attain-
ment, health, crime, and so forth.
The demise of Jim Crow was accompanied by a sharp decline in the
prevalence of its supporting belief system. This has sometimes been de-
scribed as ‘‘old-fashioned racism,’’ incorporating both a biologically
based theory of African racial inferiority and support for racial segregation
and formal racial discrimination (McConahay 1986). Old-fashioned rac-
ism has now largely been replaced by general support for the abstract
principle of racial equality (Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo 1985; Sears and
Kinder 1971). However, there is much evidence that whites do not fully
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support the implications of these general principles of equality. They have
often strongly opposed policies implementing that general principle, such
as busing or affirmative action, leading to what Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo
(1985) have called the ‘‘principle-implementation gap.’’ Similarly, black
political candidates still seem to have unusual difficulty in attracting white
support, despite some greater success in recent years. This seemingly par-
adoxical combination—widespread acceptance of the idea of racial equal-
ity mixed with continued resistance to change—is our starting point.
Is It Racism?
One possible explanation for this paradox is that racism did not disappear
as a political force with the demise of Jim Crow. Rather, some political
observers contend that racism continues to motivate much of the consider-
able white opposition to racial policies and black candidates, as in Edsall
and Edsall’s (1991) assertion that ‘‘when the official subject is presidential
politics, taxes, welfare, crime, rights, or values . . . the real subject is
race’’ (also see Edsall and Edsall 1992; Greenberg 1995). By contrast,
conservatives tout ‘‘the end of racism’’ (D’Souza 1995; also see Roth
1994).
This controversy is mirrored in academic research, with some finding
a continuing role of racism. Negative racial stereotypes have not disap-
peared (Bobo, Kluegel, and Smith 1997; Devine and Elliot 1995; Kinder
and Mendelberg 1995; Sniderman and Piazza 1993). Whites have been
found to be significantly more opposed to racially targeted policies than
to analogous policies targeted for the poor of all races (Bobo and Kluegel
1993). Racial attitudes have been shown to have substantial effects on
whites’ opposition to busing, affirmative action, or welfare spending, and
support for law and order or tax-reduction policies (Gilens 1995; Kinder
and Sanders 1996; McConahay 1982; Sears and Citrin 1985; Sears, Hen-
sler, and Speer 1979; Sears et al. 1980; Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996).
Similar analyses have found a significant role of racial attitudes in whites’
opposition to black candidates for mayor in large cities (Kinder and Sears
1981; Pettigrew 1972; Sears and Kinder 1971), or Jesse Jackson’s presi-
dential candidacy (Abramowitz 1994; Sears, Citrin, and Kosterman 1987).
There also is evidence that racism has played a role in campaigns in which
white candidates have been accused of playing the ‘‘race card,’’ such as
those of David Duke (Kuzenski, Bullock, and Gaddie 1995) or George
Bush (Kinder and Sanders 1996).
But others have been more skeptical about the continuing importance
of racism. For example, Sniderman and Piazza (1993, p. 107) believe that
‘‘the central problem of racial politics is not the problem of prejudice,’’
and that it no longer dominates whites’ preferences about racial policies.
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Hagen (1995) reports a sharp decline in white Americans’ mentioning
race as one of America’s most important problems, or as an explanation
for their candidate or party preferences. Others note that opposition to
race-targeted policies may lie instead in seemingly race-neutral attitudes,
such as ideological conservatism (Sniderman and Piazza 1993), opposi-
tion to the welfare state (Abramowitz 1994), skepticism about failed lib-
eral policies (Roth 1994), or more general attitudes about individualism
(Carmines and Merriman 1993), equality (Miller and Shanks 1996), or
partisan interest groups (Miller 1994). As a result, some argue that racial
attitudes have little residual independent effect when nonracial attitudes
are controlled for.
Our own general perspective is that of symbolic politics theory. This
theory assumes that socialization leaves individuals with strong, long-
standing attitudinal predispositions, which can be evoked by appropriate
political symbols (Sears 1993). We assume that for several centuries white
Americans have grown up in a socializing culture marked by widespread
negative attitudes toward African Americans, a socializing culture that
seems unlikely to have been abruptly overturned within the relatively few
years since the end of Jim Crow. Presenting whites with racially targeted
policies or black candidates should evoke that common antiblack element.
Our first empirical goal is to provide some systematic data on how
strong a role racism does play in white Americans’ contemporary racial
policy and candidate preferences. We attack this in four ways. Our pri-
mary analytic strategy is straightforward and reasonably standard: re-
gressing policy attitudes on indicators of racism, imposing controls on
the other plausible causal factors, especially ostensibly nonracial attitudes
(such as party identification, ideology, social welfare attitudes, and tradi-
tional social values) and demographic variables. We proceed from that
point with three further strategies. First, we test the contention (Sniderman
and Piazza 1993) that each racial policy issue elicits a different set of
underlying attitudes and values appropriate to its unique content, rather
than all tapping into a common substrate of racism. Second, we go beyond
policy issues to test the effects of racial attitudes on whites’ evaluations
of black candidates and of fringe white candidates with a reputation for
ethnocentrism. Third, we test whether or not higher education blocks the
impact of racism. It has long been established that educational level is
positively correlated with racial tolerance (see, e.g., Campbell 1971; Schu-
man, Steeh, and Bobo 1985). But does higher education, by teaching racial
tolerance, also reduce the power of racial prejudices over policy and can-
didate preferences? Sniderman and Piazza (1993) argue that it should, and
that higher education, by enlarging political sophistication, should instead
enable individuals better to connect their own nonracial ideologies and
values cognitively to ongoing policy debates. So higher education should
reduce the power of racism and increase that of ideology. The symbolic
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politics perspective, in contrast, assumes that more education should in-
crease the consistency of policy preferences with almost any long-stand-
ing predisposition, whether racial or nonracial (Sears 1993).1 Available
data concerning higher education as a moderator of the effects of racial
antagonism are somewhat mixed (see Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996;
Sniderman and Piazza 1993, pp. 117–26), so we examine whether or not
higher education mitigates the power of racial antagonism over whites’
racial policy preferences in favor of nonracial predispositions.
In pursuing these empirical goals, we by no means intend to suggest
that racism is the only factor involved, or indeed that any single factor
represents the whole story. But in view of the controversy over the role
of racism, it seems to us important to provide a rigorous and focused test
of its effects.
Forms of Racism in American Politics
Our second goal is to determine the most politically influential form of
racism today. Our view is that each historical discontinuity described at
the outset has significantly altered how ordinary citizens think about race
in politics and so has changed the nature of racism in mass politics. Others
might say that any racially based component of white resistance to change
simply reflects familiar traditional prejudices or ethnocentrism that will
always be with us (see, e.g., Sniderman and Piazza 1993).
On this point, it is important to be clear about how we are defining
‘‘racism.’’ Dictionaries commonly offer two definitions: the classic theory
of biologically based racial superiority (e.g., ‘‘a belief that race is the
primary determinant of human traits and capacities and that racial differ-
ences produce an inherent superiority of a particular race’’) and the more
general ‘‘racial prejudice or discrimination’’ (see Webster’s Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary [1989], p. 969). To avoid artificially narrowing the
search for the most politically potent form of contemporary racism, we
employ this second, more general definition. This describes a category-
based affective response to attitude objects that have to do with race, in
which racism is inferred if an individual responds systematically more
negatively to attitude objects associated with blacks than to other compa-
rable attitude objects (just as anti-Semitism is inferred when attitude ob-
jects associated with Jews are responded to especially negatively).
The contemporary empirical literature has distinguished five different
ways of conceptualizing and operationalizing racial attitudes, all of which
we will employ in our empirical comparisons.
1. Jackman and Muha (1984) have advanced yet a third view, that higher education teaches
individuals socially acceptable ways of expressing racial attitudes rather than reducing
underlying racial prejudices; this view is not addressed in our analyses.
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1. The old-fashioned racism of Jim Crow days focused on the theory
of biological superiority of the white race, and on the physical segregation
of and legalized discrimination against African Americans. It has been
variously referred to as ‘‘old-fashioned racism,’’ ‘‘redneck racism’’
(McConahay 1986; McConahay and Hough 1976), ‘‘blatant racism’’ (Pet-
tigrew and Meertens 1995), or ‘‘classical racism’’ (Sidanius, Pratto, and
Bobo 1996).
2. Stereotypes of blacks as lazy, unintelligent, morally depraved, vio-
lent, loud, and ostentatious have long been common in American society
(Devine and Elliot 1995; Katz and Braly 1933). Some of these traits in-
voke the theory of black genetic inferiority (which is also at the heart of
old-fashioned racism), while others are widely assumed to be more cultur-
ally based. Both have frequently been used in survey studies of racial
attitudes as predictors of policy and candidate preferences (see Bobo and
Kluegel 1993; Kinder and Mendelberg 1995; Sniderman and Piazza 1993;
Tuch and Hughes 1996).
3. Negative affect toward African Americans as a group has been mea-
sured most commonly with the National Election Studies (NES) ‘‘feeling
thermometer’’ (Carmines and Merriman 1993; Sears 1988; Sears and Jes-
sor 1996; Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996; Tuch and Hughes 1996). This
is usually treated as the simplest and most purely affective index of racial
prejudice.
4. Old-fashioned racism, stereotypes, and negative affect have been fa-
miliar features of the racial landscape throughout the twentieth century.
However, evidence of continuing white resistance to change in an era that
has generally renounced both biological theories of racial superiority and
legalized racial inequality has generated a variety of descriptions of a
‘‘new racism.’’ All share a component of negative attitudes toward Afri-
can Americans; they differ in what is involved beyond that, and how they
are measured. One family of concepts using very similar measurement
include ‘‘symbolic racism’’ (Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears and Kinder
1971), ‘‘modern racism’’ (McConahay 1986), ‘‘subtle racism’’ (Pettigrew
and Meertens 1995), and ‘‘racial resentments’’ (Kinder and Sanders
1996). Other ‘‘new racisms,’’ conceptualized and measured in other ways,
include ‘‘ambivalent racism’’ (Katz, Wackenhut, and Hass 1986), ‘‘aver-
sive racism’’ (Gaertner and Dovidio 1986), and ‘‘laissez-faire racism’’
(Bobo, Kluegel, and Smith 1997).
Not everyone is persuaded that the notion of a ‘‘new’’ racism is re-
quired. Some say that the old racism is still quite common, and that the
supposed decline in negative stereotyping has been exaggerated (Devine
and Elliot 1995; Sniderman and Piazza 1993). Others say that any ‘‘new’’
racism is at bottom not very different from an ‘‘old’’ racial prejudice
(Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo 1985), ethnocentrism (Sniderman and Piazza
1993), or authoritarianism (Raden 1994). Still others say that a ‘‘new’’
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racism may only look new because it merely confounds an underlying
‘‘old’’ racism with political conservatism (Fazio et al. 1995; Roth 1994;
Sniderman and Tetlock 1986; Weigel and Howes 1985). We will return
to these points below.
5. Finally, group position theory (Bobo and Hutchings 1996), realistic
group conflict theory (Bobo 1988), social dominance theory (Sidanius,
Pratto, and Bobo 1996), and social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner
1986) share the assumption that attachment to a hegemonic in-group is a
key factor. According to this perspective, the underlying psychological
motive is to protect a hegemonic in-group’s privileged position and sup-
press less powerful groups that aspire to equality. The exact content of the
myths or ideologies that promote that goal may be mostly opportunistic, if
not epiphenomenal, but presumably normally includes attachment to the
in-group.2 Operationally, positive affect toward whites as a group has most
commonly (but minimally) been indexed with an NES feeling thermome-
ter (Jessor 1988; Sears and Jessor 1996).
Symbolic Racism
Our view is that the distinctions among these five forms of racial attitudes
are important, both to capture the essence of racism in today’s mass poli-
tics, and for more fundamental psychological reasons. The symbolic poli-
tics argument would suggest that all four forms of antiblack racism draw
in part on the residues of a common negative socialization about African
Americans. But in addition to that, the content of political debate varies
from era to era. To trigger the most potent available predispositions re-
quires a political stimulus that is appropriate to the era in question. The
older forms of antiblack antagonism draw on the wellsprings of underly-
ing racial prejudice, but the content and form of contemporary racial re-
sentments have changed markedly. Old-fashioned racism has disappeared
as an effective political force, replaced by a societal consensus on general
egalitarian principles; few want to go back to the old days of formal segre-
gation and formal discrimination (Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo 1985). Neg-
ative racial affect and stereotypes are essential components of contempo-
rary racism, but only part of the story.
We argue that as a political force, symbolic racism has largely displaced
the older forms of racial attitude. Symbolic racism can be conceptualized
in three ways.3 First, it is described as ‘‘symbolic’’ because it is phrased
2. These theories note that even if the exact content is epiphenomenal, it could nevertheless
be quite consequential in practical terms. A myth that supports slavery could lead to more
negative consequences for the subordinate group than one that merely supports meritoc-
racy.
3. Here we do not attempt to develop any substantial distinction between symbolic racism
and ‘‘modern racism’’ (McConahay 1982), ‘‘subtle racism’’ (Pettigrew and Meertens
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in terms that are abstract and ideological; because it reflects whites’ moral
codes about how society should be organized rather than instrumental
beliefs satisfying their own interests; and because it focuses on blacks as
a group rather than on individual blacks (Sears and Kinder 1971). Second,
its cognitive content, as developed in earlier research, focuses explicitly
on blacks in particular and includes the beliefs that racial discrimination
is largely a thing of the past, that blacks should just work harder to over-
come their disadvantages, and that blacks are making excessive demands
for special treatment and get too much attention from elites, so their gains
are often undeserved (Sears 1988). Third, its attitudinal origins are hy-
pothesized to lie in a blend of antiblack affect with the perception that
blacks violate such traditional American values as the work ethic, tradi-
tional morality, and respect for traditional authority (Kinder and Sears
1981).
Symbolic racism and the three older indicators of antiblack racism fo-
cus only on whites’ derogation of the out-group. Does racism not also
focus on attachment to the in-group? A symbolic politics theory would
not assume that cultural socialization necessarily need embody both. To
be sure, a culture may sometimes socialize both intense pride in the in-
group, as in the Nazis’ celebration of ‘‘the Aryan race,’’ and intense dero-
gation of the out-group, as in their vigorous anti-Semitism. But the two
elements need not be highly correlated; indeed, they may often be social-
ized quite independently of each other. We would argue that the conven-
tional socialization of American whites has inculcated negative attitudes
toward African Americans without much explicit focus on whiteness or
celebration of it. American white supremacy movements are still quite
small and on the political fringe. So we would expect animosity toward
blacks to play a major role in the politics of race, but attitudes toward
whites to be quite peripheral.
The symbolic racism perspective has two empirical implications, then.
First, it argues in favor of taking seriously the differences across types
of racism, rather than assuming they are all merely different indicators
of a common underlying racial antagonism. Indeed, there is persuasive
evidence that the underlying factorial structure of these racial attitudes
yields at least two correlated factors, old-fashioned and symbolic racism.4
Second, it would argue that symbolic racism should have strong political
effects, while these older forms of racial antagonism are likely to have
rather weak ones. There have been few rigorous comparisons between
types of racism in previous research, but when assessed individually the
1995), or ‘‘racial resentments’’ (Kinder and Sanders 1996), all of which are measured in
similar fashion.
4. For general population samples, see McConahay 1986; and Pettigrew and Meertens
1995; for student samples, see Devine and Elliot 1995; Kleinpenning and Hagendoorn
1993; Monteith 1996; and Swim et al. 1995.
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older forms generally have not had very strong effects. These weak effects
do not necessarily mean that racism is a weak force in American politics;
they may just reflect looking in the wrong place for its effects, and so
underestimating its effects on whites’ political thinking.
We here repeat these assessments of the effects of older forms of rac-
ism, but adding an explicit comparison to symbolic racism, expecting that
it resonates better with whites’ contemporary political resentments of
blacks. In doing so we also specifically respond to several prior critiques
of research on symbolic racism (e.g., Colleau et al. 1990; Sniderman and
Tetlock 1986): that we do not distinguish sharply between measures of
old-fashioned racism and symbolic racism, that symbolic racism is not
internally homogeneous, that it is confounded with authoritarianism or
nonracial conservatism, and that mere content overlap between measures
of symbolic racism and those of racial policy preferences largely explain
any link between the two.
Goals and Hypotheses
The two major goals of this article, then, are to provide convincing data
on the effects of racism on racial policy and candidate preferences, and
on which form of racism is most central. It hopes to be more convincing
than past research by providing extensive replication of the same basic
test, using as independent variables (1) several different indicators of rac-
ism in each survey and (2) statistical controls on a comprehensive roster
of the other usual suspects; as dependent variables (3) the full range of
racial policies in debate today, including guarantees of equal opportunity,
special aid to blacks, and affirmative action for blacks, and (4) a range
of political candidates, including blacks, white liberals, and white conser-
vatives; and as databases (5) four different surveys, conducted by three
different survey houses for quite different purposes.
Our reasoning yields several hypotheses. Following from the assump-
tions that African Americans are a potent political symbol and that the
overriding symbolism of racially targeted policies concerns race, (1) racial
attitudes should be the single most important determinant of whites’ oppo-
sition to racial policies, while ostensibly race-neutral predispositions
should have minor effects. Concerning the various forms of racism,
(2) symbolic racism should have stronger political effects than the older
forms of racism; (3) the origins of symbolic racism should lie in both
antiblack affect and such nonracial attitudes as ideology and traditional
social values, but (4) symbolic racism should nevertheless have substan-
tial independent effect above and beyond these antecedents. The general-
ity of a role of racism should be demonstrated if (5) whites’ responses to
racial policies have a strong racial basis regardless of policy content;
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(6) racial attitudes have significant independent effects on whites’ evalua-
tions of black candidates and of fringe white candidates with a reputation
for ethnocentrism, but evaluations of mainstream white candidates are
overshadowed by nonracial partisan attitudes; (7) racial attitudes dominate
nonracial attitudes in explaining even college-educated whites’ racial pol-
icy preferences.
Method
This study uses four surveys: the 1986 (N 5 2,176) and 1992 (N 5 2,110)
National Election Studies (NES), focused on the 1986 congressional and
1992 presidential elections; the 1994 General Social Survey (GSS; N 5
2,992), focused principally on time-series measurement of sociological
indicators; and the 1995 Los Angeles County Social Survey (LACSS; N
5 595), focused on the politics of intergroup relations. These four surveys
were chosen because they each contain measures of symbolic racism as
well as measures of one or more other kinds of racial attitudes. The NES
and GSS studies are based on large representative cross-sectional samples
of American adults. The LACSS is a random digit dialing telephone sur-
vey conducted annually in Los Angeles County. For the analyses in all
four surveys only white respondents were included.5
dependent variables
Separate scales were developed for each of three areas of racial policy,
which we describe as ‘‘equal opportunity,’’ ‘‘federal assistance,’’ and
‘‘affirmative action.’’6 Perceived obligation of the federal government
to guarantee equal opportunity used (1) government assurance of fair
treatment in jobs, (2) government-guaranteed school integration, and
(3) government-guaranteed equal opportunity.7 All three items were used
in 1986, and the first two in 1992. Scale reliabilities (alpha) were .68 in
5. White respondents made up 83 percent of the respondents in the 1986 NES, 85 percent
in the 1992 NES, 79 percent in the 1994 GSS, and 44 percent in the 1995 LACSS. The
1986 NES and 1994 GSS used split-form designs with two independent samples; in each
case only one was employed in the analyses since it contained most of the racial variables.
6. This follows the procedure used in several earlier studies (see Jessor 1988; Kinder and
Sanders 1996; Sears and Kosterman 1991) and parallels Sniderman and Piazza’s (1993)
‘‘fair treatment,’’ ‘‘social welfare,’’ and ‘‘race-conscious’’ racial agendas.
7. The specific wordings were (1) ‘‘Should the government in Washington see to it that
black people get fair treatment in jobs or is this not the federal government’s business?’’
(2) ‘‘Do you think the government in Washington should see to it that white and black
children go to the same schools, or stay out of this area as it is not the government’s
business?’’ and (3) ‘‘Equal opportunity for blacks and whites to succeed is important but
it’s not really the government’s job to guarantee it.’’
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1986 and .56 in 1992. Preferences regarding the role of the government
in delivering federal assistance to blacks were measured with (1) in-
creased or decreased federal spending on programs benefiting blacks
(1986 and 1992 NES, 1994 GSS), and (2) the question, Should the govern-
ment help blacks (and other minority groups) or should they help them-
selves (1986 and 1992 NES)? Alpha reliabilities were .60 in the 1986
NES and .68 in the 1992 NES. Affirmative action scales on extending
special preferences to blacks in employment and education were available
in all four surveys: (1) preferential hiring and promotion of blacks (two
items in 1994 GSS, and one each in the 1986 NES, 1992 NES, and 1995
LACSS); (2) quotas for admitting black students in universities (1986 and
1992 NES, 1994 GSS); (3) special treatment for blacks (1986 and 1992
NES, 1994 GSS); (4) set-asides for black contractors (1995 LACSS).
Alpha reliabilities were .74 (1986 NES), .73 (1992 NES), .67 (1994 GSS),
and .61 (1995 LACSS).
Candidate evaluations were measured in the NES studies on a ‘‘feeling
thermometer,’’ where 0 is cold and 100 is warm. In 1986, the candidates
were Ronald Reagan and Jesse Jackson; in 1992, the candidates were
Jackson, Bill Clinton, George Bush, and Pat Buchanan. The appendix
gives the original item numbers or acronyms.
symbolic racism
We rely on the measures of symbolic racism used most often in previous
studies. All items refer explicitly to ‘‘blacks’’ (except in one case, to
‘‘civil rights leaders’’) as well as incorporating one of the following stan-
dard themes.
Denial of continuing racial discrimination. (1) Has there been a lot of
real change in the position of black people in the past few years? (1986
and 1992 NES). (2) Generations of slavery and discrimination have cre-
ated conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of
the lower class (1986 and 1992 NES).
Absence of positive emotions toward blacks. (3) How often have you
felt sympathy for blacks? (4) How often have you felt admiration for
blacks? (both in the 1994 GSS, drawn from Pettigrew and Meertens’s
[1995] ‘‘subtle racism’’ scale).
Blacks should work harder. (5) If blacks would only try harder they
could be just as well off as whites (1986 and 1992 NES). (6) Irish, Italians,
Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their
way up. Blacks should do the same without special favors (all surveys).
(7) Most blacks who receive money from welfare programs could get
along without it if they tried (1986 NES).
Excessive demands. (8) Are civil rights leaders trying to push too fast,
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going too slowly, or are they moving at about the right speed? (1986 and
1992 NES). (9) Blacks are getting too demanding in their push for equal
rights (1995 LACSS).
Undeserved advantage. (10) Over the past few years, blacks have got-
ten less than they deserve (1986 and 1992 NES). (11) Do blacks get much
more attention from the government than they deserve, more attention,
about the right amount, less attention, or much less attention from the
government than they deserve? (1994 GSS and 1995 LACSS). (12) Gov-
ernment officials usually pay less attention to a request or complaint from
a black person than from a white person (1986 NES). Items 1–4, 10,
and 12 were reverse-keyed. Alpha reliabilities were .78 (1986 NES, eight
items), .76 (1992 NES, six items), .65 (1994 GSS, four items), and .69
(1995 LACSS, three items).
other racial attitudes
Racial affect toward ‘‘blacks’’ (1986 and 1992 NES) and ‘‘whites’’ (1992
NES) were measured with the ‘‘feeling thermometer’’ cited above. The
stereotype items involved ratings of blacks and whites on three 7-point
scales whose endpoints were ‘‘hard-working/lazy,’’ ‘‘violent/peaceful,’’
and ‘‘unintelligent/intelligent’’ (1992 NES, 1995 LACSS; 1994 GSS,
‘‘hard-working/lazy’’ only). Scales were computed from the differences
between ratings of blacks and whites, to control for individual differences
in the use of the scale. Alpha reliabilities were .74 (1992 NES) and .69
(1995 LACSS).
Old-fashioned racism was distinguished from symbolic racism both
theoretically and empirically, according to factor analyses described later.
In the 1986 NES only: (1) the races are different due to a divine plan,
and (2) blacks come from a less able race. In the 1994 GSS only: (3) laws
against marriages between blacks and whites; (4) blacks shouldn’t push
themselves where they are not wanted; (5) white people have a right to
keep blacks out of their neighborhoods; (6) objections to sending your
children to a school where half of the children are black; (7) voting for
a black president; (8) blacks have worse jobs, income, and housing be-
cause they have less inborn ability to learn. Alpha reliabilities were .54
(1986 NES) and .71 (1994 GSS).
nonracial partisanship and values
Party identification was measured with the standard 7-point summary
variable running from ‘‘strong Democrat’’ to ‘‘strong Republican,’’ com-
bined, in the 1986 and 1992 NES only, with the difference score between
the thermometer ratings of the two parties. Alpha reliabilities were .84
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(1986 NES) and .85 (1992 NES). In the 1992 NES, 1994 GSS, and 1995
LACSS political ideology was measured with the standard 7-point sum-
mary variable running from ‘‘strong liberal’’ to ‘‘strong conservative.’’8
In 1992 the difference between the thermometer ratings of conservatives
and liberals was also included (alpha reliability was .80); in 1986, only
the thermometer difference score was used because the standard self-rat-
ing was not asked of the split sample asked the racial items. Social welfare
policy items (which did not mention blacks) were drawn from previous
studies (Abramowitz 1994; Miller 1993, 1994; Miller and Shanks 1996):
(1) fewer versus more services and spending, (2) government-guaranteed
jobs, and (3) government-guaranteed health insurance.9 Alpha reliabilities
were .36 (1986 NES, first two items only) and .63 (1992 NES, all three
items). Appropriate measurement was not available in the GSS or LACSS.
Nonracial values were also indexed with items that did not explicitly
mention blacks. Individualism scales were developed from the 1986 NES
and 1995 LACSS with items focused on the Protestant work ethic and on
the role of effort in success, yielding alpha reliabilities of .60 (six items)
and .43 (two items), respectively. The 1994 GSS measure of individualism
consisted of one item: getting ahead through hard work. Morality/sexual-
ity scales focused on the tolerance of different lifestyles, the breakdown
of moral standards, premarital sex, sexual education, and so on. Alpha
reliabilities were .81 (1986 NES, eight items), .69 (1992 NES, five items),
.65 (1994 GSS, seven items), and .72 (1995 LACSS, two items). Authori-
tarianism was measured in the 1992 NES with four items on child-rearing
values: (1) independence or respect for elders, (2) obedience or self-reli-
ance, (3) curiosity or good manners, and (4) being considerate or well
behaved. The 1994 GSS used: (1) necessary to discipline child with spank-
ing, (2) obedience and respect for authority as virtues children should
learn, and (3) the value of a child’s learning ‘‘to obey,’’ and (4) obedience
or thinking for self more important. The 1995 LACSS repeated the first
two GSS items. Alpha reliabilities were .66 (1992 NES, four items), .67
(1994 GSS, four items), and .48 (1995 LACSS, two items).
The regression equations also included controls for the four demo-
graphic variables that are usually most highly correlated with white
Americans’ racial attitudes: age, gender, and education, and in the national
surveys, a dummy variable for respondents’ region of residence (South
vs. non-South).
8. In 1992, a follow-up question for those who refused initial response did induce some
to respond, but including them actually reduced scale reliability, so they were excluded.
9. These other studies also used, variously, items on government spending to help blacks,
the poor, or the homeless, and on food stamps and research for AIDS. We selected the
more general items as more appropriate for measuring the general predisposition, and as
best measuring domestic policy spending preferences independent of any racial content.
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Table 1. Origins of Whites’ Opposition to Equal Opportunity for
Blacks
1986 NES 1992 NES
Beta (r) Beta (r)
Racial attitudes:
Symbolic racism .40*** (.57) .35*** (.49)
Black affect .11* (.28) .17** (.28)
Stereotypes ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ .04 (.25)
Old-fashioned racism .06 (.21) ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
White affect ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ .02 (.02)
Partisanship:
Ideology .12* (.32) .03 (.33)
Party identification 2.03 (.17) .06 (.25)
Social welfare .25*** (.41) .15** (.33)
Nonracial values:
Individualism .09* (.27) ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
Morality/sexuality .02 (.25) .09 (.30)
Authoritarianism ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 2.06 (.10)
Adjusted R2 (%) 42.8 31.1
Sources.—1986 and 1992 National Election Studies.
Note.—A positive entry means opposition to equal opportunity is associated with
more negative racial attitudes and more conservative political attitudes and values. The
full equations include age, education, gender, and region; those terms are not shown.
Pairwise deletion is employed.
* p , .05.
** p , .001.
*** p , .0001.
The Role of Racism
Is racism the most powerful contributor to whites’ racial policy attitudes,
as hypothesis 1 suggests? To test this, we present nine analyses that re-
gress racial attitudes, partisanship, and nonracial values (along with rele-
vant demographic controls) on attitudes toward policies providing blacks
with equal opportunity (table 1), federal assistance (table 2), and affirma-
tive action (table 3). We present both the bivariate correlations (in paren-
theses) and the standardized regression coefficients, so we can compare
the simple association of each predictor with policy attitudes against its
power with all other predictors controlled.
It is clear that racial attitudes have consistent and powerful effects.
Antiblack racial attitudes have an average correlation of .31 with these
policy preferences. But nonracial predispositions have consistently
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positive bivariate associations with these policy preferences as well: the
three partisan predispositions yield an average correlation of .25, while
the three nonracial values average .16.
When we turn to the regression analyses, however, it becomes clear
that racial attitudes consistently dominate. In every case, the strongest
single predictor of these policy preferences is a racial attitude. All nine
regression coefficients for symbolic racism are significant, averaging .39,
and all six terms for antiblack affect are significant as well. The relation-
ships of nonracial attitudes with these policy preferences are much re-
duced with racial attitudes considered. The strongest remaining nonracial
effect is that of social welfare attitudes, yielding a mean regression coef-
ficient of .16 (with five out of six terms significant). But the other nonra-
cial predictors have little residual effect: the average regression coefficient
for ideology is .03 (only three of nine significant); for party identification,
.06; for individualism, .02; for morality, .04; and for authoritarianism,
2.02. In short, in multivariate analyses, racial attitudes erase most of the
original bivariate effects of nonracial predispositions.
A convenient way to summarize these effects is shown in table 4. To
start with, the racial attitudes were entered as the first stage of a three-
stage regression analysis, the demographics were entered as the second
stage, and the nonracial attitudes were entered as the third stage. In a
parallel analysis, the nonracial attitudes were entered first, demographics
second, and the racial attitudes last. The racial attitudes, when entered
first, account for substantially more variance (25 percent, on average; see
table 4, col. 1) than do the nonracial attitudes (14 percent; col. 2). When
entered last, the racial attitudes continue to add considerable incremental
variance (15 percent, on average; col. 3), whereas the nonracial attitudes
add rather little (5 percent; col. 4). In short, racial attitudes are consistently
more powerful predictors of these racial policy preferences than are nonra-
cial attitudes.10
Which Form of Racism?
Hypothesis 2 suggested that symbolic racism would prove the strongest
of the racial attitudes. And it does, quite handily. It has by far the strongest
bivariate correlation with policy preferences, averaging .48 across the nine
tests shown in tables 1–3. The average correlations for the other racial
attitudes are lower: antiblack affect, r 5 .27; antiblack stereotypes, r 5
.23; and old-fashioned racism, r 5 .16. In the regression analyses, the
strength of symbolic racism emerges still more clearly. In all nine cases
10. We have not given much attention to the demographic controls used in each analysis.
Such controls are important, but they turned out in practice not to have very strong or
consistent effects, given the numerous more proximal attitudinal variables in the equations.
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its effects are at least double the size of any other, with an average coeffi-
cient of .39. Antiblack affect also has significant effects in every case,
though substantially weaker, averaging .13. Stereotypes and old-fashioned
racism have virtually no residual effect, with significant effects in only
two of 12 cases (and average coefficients of only .04 and 2.01, respec-
tively). All racial attitudes are not alike; symbolic racism has consistently
more political power than do antiblack affect, stereotypes, or old-fash-
ioned racism.11
What about pro-white solidarity? Hypothesis 2 suggests that animosity
toward blacks should play the central role in the politics of race, while
attitudes toward whites should be peripheral. This study does not claim
to offer a thorough test of this hypothesis. But the evidence we have sug-
gests that white affect is not a key factor. Tables 1–3 show that the ‘‘white
thermometer,’’ included in the 1992 NES, was essentially unrelated to
whites’ racial policy preferences, with a mean bivariate correlation of .01,
and a mean regression coefficient of .00. These data suggest that animosity
toward blacks has a great deal, and defense of the white in-group has
rather little, to do with whites’ racial policy preferences.
content overlap
The hypothesis that symbolic racism is a different and politically more
powerful form of racism has attracted some criticism. One concern is that
the indicators of symbolic racism themselves have too much conceptual
overlap with the dependent variables in these analyses. If symbolic racism
is merely a measure of opposition to the contemporary civil rights agenda
concerning special, race-conscious government aid to blacks in the ab-
stract, and the racial policy scales measure opposition to it in concrete
form, any association between them might reflect nothing more than that
common content.
To check on this possibility, the basic analyses shown in tables 1–3
were repeated on the 1986 and 1992 NES data after purging the symbolic
racism scales of all items alluding to government (referring to ‘‘special
favors,’’ special attention from government, or dependency on govern-
11. One concern might be that symbolic racism only has stronger effects than the other
measures of racial attitudes because it is more reliable. However, the reliability coefficients
were for the most part quite similar across racial attitudes: in 1992, the alpha coefficient
for symbolic racism was .76, compared to .74 for the stereotypes; in 1994, .65 compared
to .71 for old-fashioned racism; and in 1995, .69 compared to .69 for the stereotypes. The
one exception is that in 1986, the alpha for symbolic racism was .71, compared to .54 for
old-fashioned racism. In other cases, most notably antiblack and pro-white affect, the mea-
sures were based on single items, so no reliability estimates are available. These differences
do not appear to be sufficiently large to account for the obtained differences in impact on
policy preferences shown in tables 1–3. Ideally, we would have been able to use structural
equation modeling techniques that correct for unreliability, but a number of our predictors
were indexed by fewer than the minimum number of items.
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ment welfare payments), which would seem to be the most vulnerable to
such conceptual overlap.12 The items that were retained did not allude to
government at all, asking (1) whether there has been no real change for
blacks, (2) whether generations of slavery and discrimination make it hard
for blacks to work their way up, (3) whether blacks have gotten less than
they deserve, (4) if blacks only tried harder they would be just as well
off, and (5) civil rights people have been pushing too hard.
These scales of symbolic racism, purged of any reference to special
government attention, had slightly lower reliabilities than did the originals
(in 1986, the reliability drops from .78 to .65; in 1992, from .76 to .70).
However, their associations with the policy preference scales hardly
change at all. The average symbolic racism regression coefficients drop
only slightly, from .41 and .39 for the original scales, to .38 and .36 for
the purged scales.13 These reductions are well within the bounds of what
would be expected from the slightly lower scale reliabilities alone. Purg-
ing the symbolic racism scales of items that refer to government action
does not alter the basic findings, so the central role of symbolic racism
is not likely to be due merely to overlapping content of independent and
dependent variables.14
the origins of symbolic racism
Hypothesis 3 suggests that symbolic racism originates in a blend of anti-
black affect with the perception that blacks violate traditional nonracial
values, which we measure here with scales of individualism, morality,
and authoritarianism. In two respects the data are quite consistent with
this hypothesis. The overall model accounts for a considerable amount of
variance, ranging from 34 percent to 37 percent across the four studies,
as shown in table 5. This parallelism in r-square across the four studies
is striking given the considerable differences in model specification, and
12. This was not possible in the GSS and LACSS because of the limited range of symbolic
racism items available.
13. The mean bivariate correlations of the full symbolic racism scales with policy prefer-
ences were .52 and .49 in 1986 and 1992, respectively; the mean correlations for the purged
scales were .49 and .47.
14. Two other critiques of previous research on symbolic racism are irrelevant to this study.
In earlier studies we had developed omnibus measures of ‘‘racial intolerance’’ (or ‘‘racial
prejudice’’) that incorporated elements of both old-fashioned racism and symbolic racism
(Sears, Hensler, and Speer 1979; Sears et al. 1980). Although not intended to measure
symbolic racism, or represented as such in those papers, these have sometimes been misin-
terpreted as measures of symbolic racism (see, e.g., Sniderman and Tetlock 1986). In any
case, here we maintain a strict distinction between the two forms of racism. In another
early study we treated two policy preferences (toward busing and quotas) as subsets of
symbolic racism (Kinder and Sears 1981). While limited there to the prediction of voting
behavior in a mayoralty race, and intended to make the point that such racial issues had
become symbolic themselves, that treatment proved confusing, and in any case would
plainly be inappropriate here in predicting racial policy preferences.
T
a
b
le
5
.
Th
e
O
rig
in
s
o
fS
ym
bo
lic
R
ac
ism
19
86
N
ES
19
92
N
ES
19
94
G
SS
19
95
LA
CS
S
B
et
a
(r)
B
et
a
(r)
B
et
a
(r)
B
et
a
(r)
R
ac
ia
la
tti
tu
de
s:
B
la
ck
af
fe
ct
.
25
**
*
(.3
1)
.
21
**
*
(.2
6)
⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅
St
er
eo
ty
pe
s
⋅
⋅
⋅
.
20
**
*
(.4
0)
.
21
**
*
(.3
8)
.
29
**
*
(.4
1)
O
ld
-fa
sh
io
ne
d
ra
ci
sm
.
00
(.2
5)
⋅
⋅
⋅
.
26
**
*
(.4
4)
⋅
⋅
⋅
W
hi
te
af
fe
ct
⋅
⋅
⋅
.
09
*
(.1
4)
⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅
Pa
rti
sa
ns
hi
p:
Id
eo
lo
gy
.
16
**
*
(.2
6)
.
18
**
*
(.3
9)
.
09
(.2
1)
.
11
(.3
9)
Pa
rty
id
en
tifi
ca
tio
n
.
00
(.1
1)
2
.
01
(.1
9)
.
07
(.1
5)
.
22
**
(.4
4)
So
ci
al
w
el
fa
re
.
07
*
(.2
1)
.
11
**
(.2
5)
⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅
⋅
N
on
ra
ci
al
v
al
ue
s:
In
di
vi
du
al
ism
.
18
**
*
(.2
3)
⋅
⋅
⋅
.
03
(.0
8)
.
05
(.1
4)
M
or
al
ity
/s
ex
u
al
ity
.
14
**
*
(.3
0)
.
14
**
*
(.3
7)
.
04
(.2
6)
2
.
11
(.1
6)
A
ut
ho
rit
ar
ia
ni
sm
⋅
⋅
⋅
.
07
*
(.3
1)
.
15
*
(.3
8)
.
25
**
(.4
5)
D
em
og
ra
ph
ic
s:
A
ge
.
03
(.1
9)
.
00
(.1
5)
2
.
21
**
*
(2
.
04
)
.
13
*
(.1
7)
Ed
uc
at
io
n
2
.
34
**
*
(2
.
38
)
2
.
18
**
*
(2
.
28
)
2
.
15
**
(2
.
27
)
.
01
(2
.
14
)
G
en
de
r
2
.
01
(.0
1)
.
00
(.0
3)
2
.
10
*
(2
.
17
)
2
.
03
(2
.
14
)
R
eg
io
n
.
11
**
(.1
9)
.
07
*
(.1
4)
.
05
(.0
9)
⋅
⋅
⋅
A
dju
ste
dR
2
(%
)
35
.7
36
.8
33
.9
35
.2
So
u
rc
es
.
—
19
86
an
d
19
92
N
at
io
na
lE
le
ct
io
n
St
ud
ie
s,
19
94
G
en
er
al
So
ci
al
Su
rv
ey
,a
n
d
19
95
Lo
s
A
ng
el
es
Co
un
ty
So
ci
al
Su
rv
ey
.
N
ot
e.
—
En
tri
es
ar
e
st
an
da
rd
iz
ed
re
gr
es
sio
n
co
pe
ffi
ci
en
ts,
w
ith
bi
va
ria
te
co
rr
el
at
io
ns
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
A
po
sit
iv
e
en
tr
y
m
ea
n
s
an
ti-
bl
ac
k
o
r
co
n
se
rv
a-
tiv
e
at
tit
ud
es
ar
e
as
so
ci
at
ed
w
ith
m
o
re
sy
m
bo
lic
ra
ci
sm
.Y
ea
rs
o
fa
ge
o
r
ed
uc
at
io
n,
m
al
e
ge
nd
er
,a
n
d
So
ut
he
rn
re
gi
on
ke
ye
d
as
if
th
ey
w
er
e
co
n
se
r-
v
at
iv
e.
Pa
irw
ise
de
le
tio
n
is
em
pl
oy
ed
.
*
p
,
.
05
.
*
*
p
,
.
00
1.
*
*
*
p
,
.
00
01
.
36 Sears, van Laar, Carrillo, and Kosterman
in measurement of both the predictors and symbolic racism. Second, anti-
black affect has consistent effects throughout (whether measured directly
through the black thermometer, or indirectly through antiblack stereo-
types). Its bivariate correlations average .28, and its regression coefficients
are significant in each study. So the racial affect piece of the puzzle ap-
pears to be in place.
The other presumed component of symbolic racism, nonracial values,
has in the past proven a more elusive target (see, e.g., Sears 1988). The
original formulations cited earlier alluded in rather general terms to sev-
eral traditional values, with the door also left open to the possibility that
conservative political ideology might collect some of the variance that
had originated in one or more of these values. The data in table 5 are
roughly consistent with these expectations, although it must be said that
the expectations are rather general, and the fit quite variable across model
specifications. The average bivariate correlation of traditional values with
symbolic racism is .27, and six of the 10 regression coefficients are sig-
nificant. The three partisanship predispositions yielded a similar average
correlation (.26), with half of the ideology terms and both social welfare
terms significant.
In sum, we can be confident that these variables together consistently
explain a satisfactory amount of variance in symbolic racism, and that
symbolic racism has substantial origins in antiblack affect as well as some
mixture of conservative partisan attitudes and nonracial traditional values.
But we cannot attempt to be very precise here about the nature of that
contribution. A more thorough analysis of the origins of symbolic racism
would exceed the bounds of this article.
an emergent form of racism
We have seen that there is a strong direct effect of symbolic racism on
racial policy preferences, with rather weak effects of other attitudes. We
also have seen that symbolic racism has origins in both antiblack affect
and a mixture of conservative nonracial attitudes and values. These two
findings by themselves might be consistent with the critique cited earlier
that symbolic racism is nothing but an older form of racial prejudice con-
founded with ideological conservatism. From that view we would expect
that traditional prejudice and conservative ideology would have strong
indirect effects on racial policy preferences, with symbolic racism simply
serving as a convenient pass-through for these more fundamental atti-
tudes, adding no explanatory power itself. Our view, in contrast, is that
symbolic racism is a new and different form of racism, adding an indepen-
dent note of its own. Accordingly, hypothesis 4 predicts that symbolic
racism will have a substantial independent effect on racial policy prefer-
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ences, above and beyond whatever it mediates on behalf of ideology and
traditional prejudices.
The key statistic is the variance explained by symbolic racism when
entered in a hierarchical regression equation after all other variables have
been considered. It should explain no additional variance if it only medi-
ates the indirect effects of other variables. However, it proves to have a
substantial effect quite independent of any of the other variables. The
increment to r-square that it adds as the last stage in the equation averages
10.5 percent across these nine tests and in every test is highly significant.
The data are shown in table 4 (col. 5). This consistently strong indepen-
dent effect seems to us good evidence that symbolic racism is not merely
a mediator of other conventional racial or nonracial attitudes, but that it
represents a powerful and different form of white racial resentment.
The Generality of a Racial Response
Earlier we saw that racism is a dominant factor in whites’ opposition to
racially targeted policies. Next we take up three tests of the generality of
those racially based responses.
diverse racial policy areas
Do whites respond similarly to quite different racial policies? Hypothesis
5 suggests that the common racial symbolism in these racial policies
should dominate whites’ responses to all of them, despite their unique
features, indicating a central role of race. But if each policy issue were
to be appraised quite independently, on its own merits, nonracial factors
would seem to be more decisive (Sniderman and Piazza 1993).
One approach to this question is to use factor analysis to determine
whether or not whites’ responses to all racial policies revolve around a
single factor, presumably their common racial content. In contrast, a mul-
tiple-factor solution with uncorrelated factors would indicate that all these
policies are evaluated on their own terms, irrespective of their common
racial content. To begin with, we conducted exploratory (unconstrained)
factor analyses on the two NES studies, using principal axis (principal
factor) extraction with an oblique rotation. The 1986 data yielded two
highly correlated (phi 5 .57) factors, accounting for 41.9 percent of the
variance (table 6, cols. 1 and 2). The 1992 data yielded a single factor,
accounting for 34.9 percent of the variance. Its loadings are also shown
in table 6 (col. 3).15 An alternative test uses confirmatory factor analyses,
15. The GSS and LACSS had insufficient policy items to permit this analysis.
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Table 6. Unconstrained Factor Analyses of Racial Policy Items
1986 NES 1992 NESFactors Factor
1 2 1
Equal opportunity:
Fair treatment in jobs .68 2.02 .56
Desegregated schools .48 .16 .50
Equal opportunity .65 2.11 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
Federal assistance:
Aid to minorities .46 .19 .65
Spending to assist blacks .31 .30 .59
Affirmative action:
Preferential treatment, jobs .02 .71 .57
College quotas 2.02 .80 .66
Variance explained (%) 41.9 34.9
Sources.—1986 and 1992 National Election Studies.
Note.—Entries are pattern matrix factor loadings, with oblique rotation in 1986 (the
correlation between factors is .58).
constrained to either single-factor or three-factor solutions. In both years
the single-factor solution fits well, with all items loading on a single factor
(in 1986, the loadings ranged from .48 to .62; the results for 1992 are
shown in table 6). Constraining the analysis to a three-factor solution,
with an oblique rotation, does yield three factors in both years, but they
are highly correlated (average phi 5 .52 and .53, respectively). In sum,
the factor analytic evidence shows either a single factor on which all pol-
icy attitudes load, or a multiple-factor solution in which the obtained fac-
tors are very highly correlated. Either outcome suggests the power of the
underlying racial basis of whites’ responses to such policies.
Second, if whites are responding primarily to the common racial con-
tent of these policies, racial attitudes should play the strongest explanatory
role in all three policy areas. They do. The standardized regression coeffi-
cients for symbolic racism average .38, .39, and .41 for the three issue
areas (see tables 1 to 3, respectively). Antiblack affect has weaker and
more variable effects, but it is statistically significant in all cases. The
weaker roles of nonracial attitudes are also quite similar across areas.
Political ideology yielded average coefficients of .08, .01, and .02; party
identification, .02, .06, and .09; social welfare, .20, .22, and .05; and
morality/sexuality, .06, .02, and .04, to mention those with sufficient cases
to make an average meaningful.
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Perhaps the best summary statistic is the relative contribution of racial
and nonracial attitudes to variance explained in the three policy areas. In
each policy area, racial attitudes explain more variance than do nonracial
attitudes, regardless of the stage at which either is entered in the equation.
In each area, the pooled racial attitudes contribute at least half again as
much variance explained as do the pooled nonracial attitudes when en-
tered at the first stage (cf. cols. 1 and 2 of table 4), and they contribute
over twice as much variance as nonracial attitudes when each is entered
as the last stage of the equation (cf. cols. 3 and 4 in table 4). The incremen-
tal effect of symbolic racism when added as the last stage of the regression
is also very similar across policy areas, averaging 8.7 percent, 11.7 per-
cent, and 10.6 percent in additional r-squared, respectively. The determi-
nants of whites’ racial policy attitudes are, therefore, very much the same
across racial policy areas.
So the appropriate conclusion would seem to be that the racial content
of these policies is the feature that captures much of whites’ attention.
There is little evidence of the kind of independence of white responses
to the three policy areas hypothesized by Sniderman and Piazza (1993).
To be sure, each policy also has its own idiosyncratic features to which
whites respond, and which account for any differences in the frequency
of opposition to each policy.16 But this indeterminacy should not blind us
to the powerful evidence for a central role of racial attitudes in forming
these preferences.
candidate evaluations
This literature has been concerned with the evaluation of political candi-
dates as well as with racial policies. Hypothesis 6 suggests that racial
attitudes are likely to have clear independent effects on the evaluations
of black candidates, or of white candidates who engage in explicitly ethno-
centric appeals, but less effect on those of more mainstream white major-
party presidential candidates. To test this hypothesis, we examined evalua-
tions of the most prominent candidates in the 1986 and 1992 National
Election Studies (the 1994 GSS and 1995 LACSS had no items on candi-
dates). The data are shown in table 7.
This hypothesis receives substantial support. First, consider evaluations
of Jesse Jackson, the most visible black candidate. In 1986 and 1992, both
symbolic racism and antiblack affect have significant effects, of about
equal magnitude. So does nonracial partisanship. Symbolic racism also
contributes significantly to support for Pat Buchanan, the closest in these
data sets to an explicitly ethnocentrically oriented white candidate, but
16. A thorough canvass of survey data on differences in white support across the three
policy areas is beyond the scope of this article.
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not as much as do party identification and ideology. Racial attitudes have
no systematic effect on evaluations of the more mainstream major-party
white leaders, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton. Only two of the nine relevant
coefficients are significant in the expected direction (and two in the oppo-
site direction). Their evaluations are much more influenced by party iden-
tification and ideology.17 Racial attitudes in general, and symbolic racism
in particular, are triggered first and foremost by candidates with a manifest
connection to African Americans.
the role of higher education
Finally, a more refined version of the emphasis on nonracial conservatism
assumes a moderating effect of education. According to Sniderman and
Piazza (1993), higher education, by teaching racial tolerance, should damp
the political effects of racial prejudice and, by enlarging political sophisti-
cation, enhance one’s ability to connect ongoing policy disputes to nonra-
cial ideologies and values. In contrast, hypothesis 7, reflecting the sym-
bolic politics perspective, assumes that more education will increase the
consistency of policy preferences with any long-standing predispositions,
and therefore racial attitudes should remain dominant even among the
college-educated.
To test these hypotheses, we have split the samples into those with
college degrees and those with no college (conforming to Sniderman and
Piazza’s [1993] procedures).18 In fact, symbolic racism had substantially
stronger bivariate correlations with racial policy preferences among the
college-educated (average r 5 .64) than it did among the less educated
(average r 5 .44). The regression coefficients for symbolic racism tend
to be somewhat higher among the better-educated, but the differences
between education groups are not large and none is significant, as shown
in table 8. Nor are the older and simpler forms of racial animosity more
potent among those with no college education; neither the bivariate corre-
lations nor the regression coefficients (see table 8) differ much across the
17. The role of any given attitude in the evaluations of contemporary major-party presiden-
tial nominees depends to a considerable extent on the exact model specification. Others
find, as we do, that entering most available nonracial attitudes displaces the direct effects
of racial attitudes (see Abramowitz 1994; Miller 1994; Miller and Shanks 1996; also see
Citrin, Green, and Sears 1990). However, that assumes they are causally prior to racial
attitudes, which is inconsistent with much theory and evidence about the early origins of
racial attitudes. Including only a minimal set of nonracial attitudes to adhere to this latter
assumption yields substantially stronger effects of racial attitudes (Kinder and Sanders
1996). It is difficult to see how any single cross-sectional study can resolve this dilemma
to everyone’s satisfaction.
18. We have used only the two NES surveys in these analyses. The LACSS had too few
white respondents to allow for reliable estimates among the college graduates, as did the
1994 GSS, because of its complex split-sample design (fewer than 40 white college gradu-
ates remained with data on our key variables).
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two education groups.19 On balance there is no evidence of any systemati-
cally stronger impact of racism among the less educated than among the
college-educated.
As predicted from both theoretical perspectives, education strengthens
the bivariate correlations of ideology and the other partisan predisposi-
tions with policy preferences: the mean correlation of partisan attitudes
with policy preferences is .47 among the college educated and .17 among
the less educated. But there are no systematic differences between educa-
tion groups in the regression coefficients, because of the strong effects of
symbolic racism in both educational groups.20
The data support hypothesis 7 quite well, then. The ordering of pre-
dictive power among these various predispositions is quite parallel among
college-educated and non-college-educated whites: symbolic racism in
particular, and racial attitudes in general, are considerably stronger than
are nonracial predispositions even among the college-educated. Moreover,
all these predispositions together account considerably better for policy
preferences among the college-educated: as table 8 shows, in each case
the total r-squared is almost twice as high as it is for the less educated.
There is no evidence that a college education leads to a replacement of
racism by ideology as the key determinant of these policy preferences.
Discussion
the role of racism
The first goal of this study was to provide a systematic test of the hypothe-
sis that racial attitudes make the pivotal contribution to whites’ opposition
to race-targeted policies. The data seem to us quite clear: racial predisposi-
tions dominate all other factors in terms of individual correlations or re-
gression coefficients, and in their capacity for explaining variance in pol-
icy preferences. Nonracial attitudes (such as political ideology, party
identification, social welfare policy attitudes, and such traditional social
values as individualism, morality, and authoritarianism) have been as thor-
19. For racial affect, the average correlations for the high- and low-education groups are
.26 and .28, respectively; for stereotypes, .28 and .20; and .21 and 2.08 for old-fashioned
racism.
20. The average correlations for the nonracial values were .29 and .08 at the two educational
levels. Because of the general weakness of nonracial values in the regression equations
and to conserve space, their results are not shown in table 8. In brief, however, only authori-
tarianism has a significant effect among the highly educated, and that, in only one case.
For none of the values are there strong or consistent differences between educational
groups.
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oughly controlled for as possible, and they do not have strong effects;
they are overshadowed by the effects of racism.21
Further evidence of the generality of a racially based response is the
considerable commonality in whites’ responses to these different racial
policy areas. We have not attempted a systematic assessment of possible
differences in level of white support across areas. But by two other criteria
we find some striking similarities of response. The underlying structure of
racial policy attitudes fits either a simple single-factor model or a multiple-
factor model with highly correlated factors. This complements other find-
ings that racial policy attitudes tend to load on a single factor distinct
from nonracial attitudes (Abramowitz 1994; Sears and Kosterman 1991).
Also, the determinants of policy preferences are quite similar across pol-
icy areas, even when measured in different surveys. These findings sug-
gest that race is the dominant cue governing whites’ responses to explic-
itly race-targeted policies, although other features of the policies clearly
are visible as well.22
Racial attitudes also influence evaluations of black and ethnocentric
white candidates but do not have a clear independent influence on evalua-
tions of the major-party presidential candidates. Finally, racial attitudes
dominate racial policy preferences even among college graduates, con-
trary to the view that college education damps their effects.
These findings are quite consistent with the symbolic politics notion
with which we began. Most of the racial and nonracial predictors had
significant bivariate correlations with all our dependent variables. But
when all factors were considered simultaneously, racial attitudes domi-
nated preferences regarding racial policy (as well as of the black candi-
date, Jesse Jackson, and the ethnocentric white candidate, Pat Buchanan).
Presumably, the explicit racial content of these attitude objects evoked
racial predispositions. The mainstream white candidates, in contrast, seem
to have evoked primarily nonracial predispositions. Moreover, higher edu-
cation (as with higher information flows more generally) increased the
constraint of all these predictor attitudes with policy and candidate evalua-
tions—but did not influence the balance between racial and nonracial pre-
dictors.
This conclusion, that racism (in whatever form) is central to these politi-
cal preferences, is contrary to that offered by some other researchers (e.g.,
Roth 1994; Sniderman and Piazza 1993). The difference, we believe, lies
in our more comprehensive and systematic examination of antecedent ra-
21. Indeed, some might feel that we have overcontrolled for nonracial attitudes, since the
partisan attitudes, at least, tend to be correlated with racial attitudes (see Sidanius, Pratto,
and Bobo 1996). However, we prefer this more conservative test of the effects of racism.
22. Other evidence indicates that racial attitudes have stronger effects regarding explicitly
racial policies than regarding only implicitly racial ones such as welfare or crime (Abra-
mowitz 1994; Kinder and Mendelberg 1995; Sears, Citrin, and van Laar 1995).
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cial attitudes, and our more thorough replication across policy areas and
across surveys.
symbolic racism
Our second major goal was to test the hypothesis that symbolic racism
is a considerably stronger political force in contemporary America than
are other, more traditional indicators of racial prejudice. This case, too,
we believe has been made quite strongly in our data. In bivariate correla-
tions or in regression analyses, symbolic racism dominates, while stereo-
types and old-fashioned racism have little residual effect.23 Nor does pro-
white loyalty play a significant role in opposition to racial policies. Other
researchers’ reports in the published literature of weak effects of racial
attitudes have arisen, we believe, because they have been looking in the
wrong place for them. This is not to say that antiblack affect and tradi-
tional racial stereotypes (or even pockets of old-fashioned racism) no
longer exist. But they no longer have the political strength that symbolic
racism has.24
The hypothesis that symbolic racism is a different and politically more
powerful form of racism has attracted several critiques that need to be
addressed. One is that symbolic racism may not be very different from
older forms of prejudice such as stereotypes or old-fashioned racism
(Fazio et al. 1995; Miller 1994; Raden 1994; Sniderman and Tetlock 1986;
Weigel and Howes 1985). Indeed, in our data they were correlated, but
the consistently greater impact of symbolic racism compared with older
forms of racial antagonism, across a number of different replications,
would seem to indicate that it is a distinctive orientation.25 Moreover, sym-
bolic racism contributes substantial independent variance of its own to
racial policy preferences in addition to mediating some of the effects of
its putative antecedents (antiblack affect and conservative nonracial val-
ues and attitudes). But to test directly for its independence, we conducted
unconstrained factor analyses (with oblique rotation) of all racial indepen-
dent variables in each survey. In brief, in every survey all symbolic racism
23. Kinder and Sanders (1996) report roughly similar effects on racial policy preferences
of antiblack stereotypes in the 1990 GSS and of ‘‘racial resentments’’ in the 1986 NES.
However, they treat the comparison as somewhat speculative because it is made across
two different surveys in two different years rather than within one, the two sets of racial
attitude predictors are not compared in the same model, and the dependent variables are
different in the two surveys.
24. And, though not a feature of this study, we have found elsewhere that symbolic racism
acts less like general ethnocentrism than like a more specifically antiblack antagonism
(Sears, Citrin, and van Laar 1995).
25. The average correlation between symbolic racism and the other racial attitudes was
.35; the correlations among the other racial attitudes averaged .28, as shown in table 5
(also see Miller 1994).
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items loaded on a factor separate from those on which the older forms of
racial antagonism loaded.26
A second critique is that symbolic racism may not be internally very
homogeneous (Colleau et al. 1990; Sniderman and Tetlock 1986). How-
ever, the factor analyses of racial attitudes just described, yielding a dis-
tinctive factor for symbolic racism in each survey, along with the quite
reasonable levels of scale reliability for symbolic racism cited earlier, av-
eraging about .70, sustain the view that symbolic racism is a reasonably
internally homogenous construct.
A third critique is that symbolic racism is ‘‘confounded’’ with ideologi-
cal conservatism and so does not cleanly assess the unique effects of
racism. Ours would seem to be quite persuasive data against that view:
controls on ideology do not weaken the effects of symbolic racism on
policy references, and ideology itself has generally nonsignificant effects
(tables 1–3); symbolic racism adds substantial unique explanatory vari-
ance even after ideology and all other nonracial attitudes have been con-
sidered (table 4); and ideology is not a strong determinant of symbolic
racism (table 5).
Fourth, others have suspected that symbolic racism might be just a mi-
nor variant of authoritarianism (Raden 1994; Weigel and Howes 1985),
or that it might have lesser effects than authoritarianism (Sniderman and
Piazza 1993). Again, our evidence would seem persuasive against both
views. The raw correlations between the two are substantial (averaging
.38; see table 5), but in the regression analyses authoritarianism is a mod-
est contributor to either symbolic racism or racial policy preferences, hav-
ing less effect than racial attitudes in each case. Authoritarianism and
symbolic racism undoubtedly share some variance, but the explicitly ra-
cial character of symbolic racism is a critical distinction between them.
A fifth concern is that the impact of symbolic racism is just a result of
conceptual overlap with our dependent variables. If symbolic racism
merely measured opposition to special, race-conscious government aid to
blacks in the abstract, and the racial policy scales, opposition to it in con-
crete form, any association between them might reflect nothing more than
that common content. To begin with, it might be noted that abstract and
concrete versions of sociopolitical attitudes are not invariably consistent
26. Specifically, the 1986 NES yielded two modestly correlated factors (phi 5 .25); all
symbolic racism items loaded on the first factor, and all old-fashioned racism items, on
the second, while the black thermometer failed to load on either (loadings , .30). The
1992 NES yielded three factors: all symbolic racism items loaded on one, all stereotypes
on the second, and the black and white thermometers on the third (only the first and second
factors were highly correlated, phi 5 .49). The 1994 GSS yielded two correlated factors
(phi 5 .48); the symbolic racism items loaded on one, and the old-fashioned racism items
on the second. And the 1995 LACSS yielded two correlated (.51) factors, the stereotypes
loading on one and the symbolic racism items on the second (see McConahay 1986 for
similar analyses).
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with each other. Classic cases include the ‘‘principle-implementation’’
gap in racial attitudes (Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo 1985), the gap in re-
sponses to abstract and concrete versions of civil liberties, or the common
preference for both ‘‘smaller government’’ and increased spending on
specific services (see, e.g., Sears and Citrin 1985).
But we have more concrete evidence against this interpretation. (1) The
effects of symbolic racism are not confined to contemporary race-
conscious policies of special treatment for blacks but occur just as consis-
tently concerning the equal opportunity policies dating from the 1950s
(compare table 1 with table 3). Any policy issues with manifest racial
content seem to evoke symbolic racism. (2) Symbolic racism has consis-
tently significant effects on evaluations of Jesse Jackson and Pat Bu-
chanan, neither of whom, as an attitude object, presumably suffers from
this conceptual overlap.27 (3) We have imposed substantial controls on
ideology, party identification, and social welfare attitudes, which bear di-
rectly on the magnitude of government action but make no explicit refer-
ence to blacks. They consistently have weaker effects than does symbolic
racism, whose effects are not substantially reduced by such controls. And
(4) we earlier presented analyses purging the symbolic racism scales of
any items alluding to government action and ‘‘special favors,’’ which
reduced their reliability and predictive power very little. ‘‘Content over-
lap’’ does not seem to account for much of the link between symbolic
racism and racial policy preferences.
Conclusions
The strengths of our analyses lie in the consistency of the findings across
different tests, we believe. The basic findings are replicated in four differ-
ent surveys spanning nearly a decade, and on three different policy areas.
The basic independent and dependent variables were all operationalized
somewhat differently across the four studies, giving some further confi-
dence in the generality of the findings. And the findings are remarkably
parallel across all these variations. We have not tried to squeeze a great
deal of subtlety from the data; our goal in this article has been to insure
that the main findings are strong and replicable, and we have confidence
that they are. Indeed, given the considerable replication of our core find-
ings within this article, it seems likely that contrary reports based on single
surveys may have overinterpreted possibly chance departures from the
essential story.
27. Although the evaluation of any candidate obviously depends in part on issue proximi-
ties.
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Finally, we should take note of four important questions that we have
not attempted to resolve in this article. As Bobo (1988; also Bobo,
Kluegel, and Smith 1997) has correctly observed, we have not here or
elsewhere attempted to analyze the forces that gave rise to the shift from
old-fashioned to symbolic racism; that probably requires a different form
of analysis altogether. Second, we have indicated that an additive model
involving both antiblack affect and conservative nonracial attitudes and
values explains the origins of symbolic racism moderately well. However,
we have not traveled far down the road of unraveling exactly which nonra-
cial dispositions are involved, nor do we test nonadditive models, and
both issues deserve more thorough analysis (see Sears and Kosterman
1991; Wood 1994). Third, we have not attempted to address in detail the
numerous variants on a realistic group conflict model cited earlier. And,
finally, there is work going forward on the assumption that indirect mea-
sures of prejudice will be more valid than the direct measures we have
used (Banaji and Greenwald 1994; Fazio et al. 1995; Gaertner and Dovi-
dio 1986). Our findings seem fairly robust, however, despite whatever
weaknesses the direct approach entails (and recent findings suggest indi-
rect and direct measures may in fact be producing very similar results,
after all; see Wittenbrink, Judd, and Park 1997).
In conclusion, we hope that the strength of the findings here will lay
to rest the notion that white opposition to racially targeted policies is pri-
marily motivated by nonracial considerations, or that any racially based
motivation is limited to a few poorly educated ethnocentrics or believers
in white supremacy. Racism is considerably more widespread in Ameri-
can society than that, it cannot be reduced to the older forms of prejudice
familiar in the pre–civil rights era, and it continues to have quite pervasive
effects. It is not a pleasant aspect of our society, but it is not one that
should be swept under the carpet, either.
Appendix
The items comprising each scale are as follows:
Equal opportunity. V485, V506, and V522 in 1986 NES; and V5932 and
V5938 in 1992 NES.
Federal assistance. V334 and V426 in 1986 NES; V3724 and V3729 in 1992
NES; and NATRACE and NATRACY combined in the 1994 GSS.
Affirmative action. V476 and V478 in 1986 NES; V5936 and V5948 in 1992
NES; AFFRMACT, JOBAFF, and HELPBLK in 1994 GSS; and B19A and
CNTB in 1995 LACSS.
Candidates. V130 and V145 in 1986 NES; and V3315, V3316, V5301, and
V5302 in 1992 NES.
Symbolic racism. V559, V562, V565–V568, V579, and V580 in 1986 NES;
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V5929, V5930, V6126–V6129 in 1992 NES; ADMIRBLK, SYMPTBLK,
BLKGOVT, and WRKWAYUP in 1994 GSS; and C24B, BSR3, and BPER in
1995 LACSS.
Old-fashioned racism. V578 and V582 in 1986 NES; and RACSEG, RAC-
PUSH, RACMAR, RACPRES, RACHAF, and RACDIF2 in 1994 GSS.
Thermometers. Black thermometer V149 in 1986 NES; and V5323 in 1992.
White thermometer V5333 in 1992 NES.
Stereotypes. Black stereotypes: V6222, V6226, and V6230 in 1992 NES;
WORKBLKS in 1994 GSS; and GPEB, C25B1, and GPIB in 1995 LACSS.
White stereotypes: V6221, V6225, and V6229 in 1992 NES; WORKWHTS in
1994 GSS; and GPEW, C25B, and GPIW in 1995 LACSS.
Partisanship. Party identification: V146, V147, and V300 in 1986 NES;
V3317, V3318, and V3634 in 1992 NES; PARTYID in 1994 GSS; GS86, G86A,
and G86B combined in 1995 LACSS. Political ideology: V3509, V5319, and
V5326 in 1992 NES; POLVIEWS in 1994 GSS; GA88, G88A, G88B, and G88C
combined in 1995 LACSS. Social welfare policy: V448 and V486 in 1986 NES;
V3701, V3716, and V3718 in 1992 NES.
Nonracial values. Individualism: V508–V513 in 1986 NES; GETAHEAD in
1994 GSS; and R232 and NTSY in 1995 LACSS. Authoritarianism: V6019–
V6022 in 1992 NES; OBEY, OBEYTHNK, OBRESPCT, and SPANKING in
1994 GSS; and C26B and VAL5 in 1995 LACSS. Morality/sexuality: V525–
V532 in 1986 NES; V6115–V6119 in 1992 NES; COHABOK, PREMARSX,
TEENSEX, SEXEDUC, HOMOSEX, XMARSEX, and PILLOK in 1994 GSS;
and SEXM and SEXP in 1995 LACSS.
Demographic controls. Age: V595 in 1986 NES; V3903 in 1992 NES; AGE
in 1994 GSS; and RAGE in 1995 LACSS. Gender: V755 in 1986 NES; V6246
in 1992 NES; SEX in 1994 GSS; and RSEX in 1995 LACSS. Education: V602
in 1986 NES; V3908 in 1992 NES; DEGREE in the 1994 GSS; and DM08 in
the 1995 LACSS. Region (dummy based on): V25 for 1986 NES; V3104 for
1992 NES; and REGION in 1994 GSS.
References
Abramowitz, A. I. 1994. ‘‘Issue Evolution Reconsidered: Racial Attitudes and
Partisanship in the U.S. Electorate.’’ American Journal of Political Science 38:1–24.
Banaji, M. R., and A. G. Greenwald. 1994. ‘‘Implicit Stereotyping and Prejudice.’’ In
The Psychology of Prejudice: The Ontario Symposium, vol. 7, ed. M. P. Zanna and
J. M. Olson. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Bobo, L. 1988. ‘‘Group Conflict, Prejudice, and the Paradox of Contemporary Racial
Attitudes.’’ In Eliminating Racism: Profiles in Controversy, ed. P. Katz and D.
Taylor. New York: Plenum.
Bobo, L., and V. L. Hutchings. 1996. ‘‘Perceptions of Racial Group Competition:
Extending Blumer’s Theory of Group Position to a Multiracial Social Context.’’
American Sociological Review 61:951–73.
Bobo, L., and J. R. Kluegel. 1993. ‘‘Opposition to Race-Targeting: Self-Interest,
Stratification Ideology, or Racial Attitudes?’’ American Sociological Review 58:443–
64.
Bobo, L., J. R. Kluegel, and R. A. Smith. 1997. ‘‘Laissez Faire Racism: The
Crystallization of a ‘Kinder, Gentler’ Anti-Black Ideology.’’ In Racial Attitudes in
Is It Really Racism? 51
the 1990s: Continuity and Change, ed. S. A. Tuch and J. K. Martin. Westport, CT:
Praeger.
Campbell, A. 1971. White Attitudes toward Black People. Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for
Social Research.
Carmines, E. G., and W. R. Merriman, Jr. 1993. ‘‘The Changing American Dilemma:
Liberal Values and Racial Policies.’’ In Prejudice, Politics, and the American
Dilemma, ed. P. M. Sniderman, P. E. Tetlock, and E. G. Carmines. Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press.
Citrin, J., D. P. Green, and D. O. Sears. 1990. ‘‘White Reactions to Black Candidates:
When Does Race Matter?’’ Public Opinion Quarterly 54:74–96.
Colleau, S. M., K. Glynn, S. Lybrand, R. M. Merelman, P. Mohan, and J. E. Wall.
1990. ‘‘Symbolic Racism in Candidate Evaluation: An Experiment.’’ Political
Behavior 12:385–402.
Devine, P. G., and A. J. Elliot. 1995. ‘‘Are Racial Stereotypes Really Fading? The
Princeton Trilogy Revisited.’’ Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 21:1139–
50.
D’Souza, D. 1995. The End of Racism. New York: Free Press.
Edsall, T. B., and M. D. Edsall. 1991. ‘‘When the Official Subject Is Presidential
Politics, Taxes, Welfare, Crime, Rights, or Values . . . the Real Subject Is Race.’’
Atlantic Monthly (May), pp. 53–86.
———. 1992. Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American
Politics. New York: Norton.
Fazio, R. H., J. R. Jackson, B. C. Dunton, and C. J. Williams. 1995. ‘‘Variability in
Automatic Activation as an Unobtrusive Measure of Racial Attitudes: A Bona Fide
Pipeline?’’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 69:1013–27.
Gaertner, S. L., and J. F. Dovidio. 1986. ‘‘The Aversive Form of Racism.’’ In
Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism, ed. J. F. Dovidio and S. L. Gaertner, pp. 61–
89. Orlando, FL: Academic Press.
Gilens, M. 1995. ‘‘Racial Attitudes and Opposition to Welfare.’’ Journal of Politics 57:
994–1014.
Greenberg, S. B. 1995. Middle Class Dreams. New York: New York Times Books.
Hagen, M. G. 1995. ‘‘References to Racial Issues.’’ Political Behavior 17:49–88.
Jackman, M. R., and M. J. Muha. 1984. ‘‘Education and Intergroup Attitudes: Moral
Enlightenment, Superficial Democratic Commitment, or Ideological Refinement?’’
American Sociological Review 49:751–69.
Jessor, T. 1988. ‘‘Personal Interest, Group Conflict, and Symbolic Group Affect:
Explanations for Whites’ Opposition to Racial Equality.’’ Doctoral dissertation,
Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles.
Katz, D., and K. W. Braly. 1933. ‘‘Racial Stereotypes of 100 College Students.’’
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 28:280–90.
Katz, I., J. Wackenhut, and R. G. Hass. 1986. ‘‘Racial Ambivalence, Value Duality,
and Behavior.’’ In Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism, ed. J. F. Dovidio and S.
L. Gaertner, pp. 35–60. New York: Academic Press.
Kinder, D. R., and T. Mendelberg. 1995. ‘‘Cracks in American Apartheid: The Political
Impact of Prejudice among Desegregated Whites.’’ Journal of Politics 57:402–24.
Kinder, D. R., and L. M. Sanders. 1996. Divided by Color: Racial Politics and
Democratic Ideals. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kinder, D. R., and D. O. Sears. 1981. ‘‘Prejudice and Politics: Symbolic Racism versus
Racial Threats to the Good Life.’’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 40:
414–31.
Kleinpenning, G., and L. Hagendoorn. 1993. ‘‘Forms of Racism and the Cumulative
Dimension of Ethnic Attitudes.’’ Social Psychology Quarterly 56:21–36.
Kuzenski, J. C., C. S. Bullock III, and R. K. Gaddie, eds. 1995. David Duke and the
Politics of Race in the South. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press.
McConahay, J. B. 1982. ‘‘Self-Interest versus Racial Attitudes as Correlates of Anti-
busing Attitudes in Louisville: Is It the Buses or the Blacks?’’ Journal of Politics 44:
692–720.
———. 1986. ‘‘Modern Racism, Ambivalence, and the Modern Racism Scale.’’ In
52 Sears, van Laar, Carrillo, and Kosterman
Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism, ed. J. F. Dovidio and S. L. Gaertner, pp. 91–
126. Orlando, FL: Academic Press.
McConahay, J. B., and J. C. Hough, Jr. 1976. ‘‘Symbolic Racism.’’ Journal of Social
Issues 32:23–45.
Miller, A. H. 1993. ‘‘Economic, Character, and Social Issues in the 1992 Presidential
Election.’’ American Behavioral Scientist 37:315–27.
———. 1994. ‘‘Social Groups as Symbols in America’s Sense of Democratic
Consensus.’’ In Presidential Campaigns and American Self Images, ed. A. H. Miller
and B. E. Gronbeck. Boulder, CO: Westview.
Miller, W. E., and J. M. Shanks. 1996. The New American Voter. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Monteith, M. J. 1996. ‘‘Contemporary Forms of Prejudice-Related Conflict: In Search
of a Nutshell.’’ Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 22:461–73.
Pettigrew, T. F. 1972. ‘‘When a Black Candidate Runs for Mayor: Race and Voting
Behavior.’’ In Urban Affairs Annual Review, 1972, ed. H. Hahn, pp. 95–117.
Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Pettigrew, T. F., and R. W. Meertens. 1995. ‘‘Subtle and Blatant Prejudice in Western
Europe.’’ European Journal of Social Psychology 25:57–75.
Raden, D. 1994. ‘‘Are Symbolic Racism and Traditional Prejudice Part of a
Contemporary Authoritarian Attitude Syndrome?’’ Political Behavior 16:365–84.
Roth, B. M. 1994. Prescription for Failure: Race Relations in the Age of Social
Science. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
Schuman, H., C. Steeh, and L. Bobo. 1985. Racial Trends in America: Trends and
Interpretations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Sears, D. O. 1988. ‘‘Symbolic Racism.’’ In Eliminating Racism: Profiles in
Controversy, ed. P. A. Katz and D. A. Taylor, pp. 53–84. New York: Plenum.
———. 1993. ‘‘Symbolic Politics: A Socio-Psychological Theory.’’ In Explorations in
Political Psychology, ed. S. Iyengar and W. J. McGuire, pp. 113–49. Durham, NC:
Duke University Press.
Sears, D. O., and J. Citrin. 1985. Tax Revolt: Something for Nothing in California.
Enlarged edition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Sears, D. O., J. Citrin, and R. Kosterman. 1987. ‘‘Jesse Jackson and the Southern
White Electorate in 1984.’’ In Blacks in Southern Politics, ed. L. W. Moreland, R. P.
Steed, and T. A. Baker, pp. 209–25. New York: Praeger.
Sears, D. O., J. Citrin, and C. van Laar. 1995. ‘‘Black Exceptionalism in a
Multicultural Society.’’ Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American
Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1.
Sears, D. O., C. P. Hensler, and L. K. Speer. 1979. ‘‘Whites’ Opposition to ‘Busing’:
Self-Interest or Symbolic Politics?’’ American Political Science Review 73:369–
84.
Sears, D. O., and T. Jessor. 1996. ‘‘Whites’ Racial Policy Attitudes: The Role of White
Racism.’’ Social Science Quarterly 77:751–59.
Sears, D. O., and D. R. Kinder. 1971. ‘‘Racial Tensions and Voting in Los Angeles.’’
In Los Angeles: Viability and Prospects for Metropolitan Leadership, ed. W. Z.
Hirsch. New York: Praeger.
Sears, D. O., and R. Kosterman. 1991. ‘‘Is It Really Racism? The Origins and
Dynamics of Symbolic Racism.’’ Paper presented at the annual meeting of the
Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April.
Sears, D. O., R. R. Lau, T. R. Tyler, and H. M. Allen, Jr. 1980. ‘‘Self-Interest vs.
Symbolic Politics in Policy Attitudes and Presidential Voting.’’ American Political
Science Review 74:670–84.
Sidanius, J., F. Pratto, and L. Bobo. 1996. ‘‘Racism, Conservatism, Affirmative Action,
and Intellectual Sophistication: A Matter of Principled Conservatism or Group
Dominance?’’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 70:1–15.
Sniderman, P. M., and T. Piazza. 1993. The Scar of Race. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Sniderman, P. M., and P. E. Tetlock. 1986. ‘‘Symbolic Racism: Problems of Motive
Attribution in Political Debate.’’ Journal of Social Issues 42:129–50.
Is It Really Racism? 53
Swim, J. K., K. J. Aikin, W. S. Hall, and B. A. Hunter. 1995. ‘‘Sexism and Racism:
Old-Fashioned and Modern Prejudices.’’ Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology 68:199–214.
Tajfel, H., and J. C. Turner. 1986. ‘‘The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup
Behavior.’’ In Psychology of Intergroup Relations, ed. S. Worchel and W. G. Austin,
2d ed. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
Tuch, S. A., and M. Hughes. 1996. ‘‘Whites’ Racial Policy Attitudes.’’ Social Science
Quarterly 77:723–45.
Weigel, R. H., and P. W. Howes. 1985. ‘‘Conceptions of Racial Prejudice: Symbolic
Racism Reconsidered.’’ Journal of Social Issues 41:117–38.
Wittenbrink, B., C. M. Judd, and B. Park. 1997. ‘‘Evidence for Racial Prejudice at the
Implicit Level and Its Relationship with Questionnaire Measures.’’ Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology 72:262–74.
Wood, J. 1994. ‘‘Is ‘Symbolic Racism’ Racism? A Review Informed by Intergroup
Behavior.’’ Political Psychology 15:673–86.
